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Editorial

THE Lambeth Conference of 1948 was of the opinion that the time had not come for the "further formal consideration" of the question of the ordination of women to the priesthood (*Report*, p. 52). But the whole subject of the ministry of women calls for much more informal consideration than it has yet received. An important contribution to this consideration was made by the Master of St Peter's Hall, Oxford, in three sermons which he preached before the university in 1947, 1948, and 1949, and which have since been published.[1]

Professor Leonard Hodgson contributes a foreword in which he expresses his belief that "the ordination of women to the priesthood and their consecration to the episcopate is a step forward which our Lord is urging upon His Church." We have not for our part reached this conclusion, but we have never met so weighty and persuasive a presentation of the case as that which is put forward by Canon Howard, and we feel bound to call attention to it. Unfortunately, as Professor Hodgson says, "the subject is so charged with emotional dynamite that dispassionate discussion is difficult to secure." For this reason he confesses that "the coward in me, which shrinks from strife, would be glad if all mention of it could be avoided till after I am gone," and we sympathize with this confession. But, having read Canon Howard's book, we do not think that anyone should be content to leave the matter where it is, to be reopened perhaps in a more or less remote future.

His three sermons dealt with "The Precedents," "The Principles," and "Practical Problems." In the course of them he appears to ask and answer all the pertinent questions. The decisive question is that of principle. Is there a principle according to which women are inherently, and therefore for ever, incapable of being admitted to the office of priesthood? If there is such a principle, then precedents serve only to illustrate it and the practical problems, which would be raised by the ordination of women, do not arise. There may be such a principle, but if so it does not seem to us that it has yet been convincingly elucidated.

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Readers of THEOLOGY will be glad to hear that Dr Yngve Brilioth, the eminent ecclesiastical historian and friend of the Church of England, has been appointed Archbishop of Uppsala and Primate of Sweden. We hope that closer relations between the Church of England and the Church of Sweden will result.

[1] *Should Women be Priests?* By R. W. Howard, Blackwell, 2s. 6d.

Prayer for the Departed

THE practice of praying for the departed and of holding "Requiem" celebrations of the Holy Communion is becoming increasingly common in the Anglican Church.

At the Reformation, as is well known, all prayer for the departed was ruthlessly removed from the worship of the Church of England because it was thought to imply the medieval doctrine of purgatory, which the Reformers were concerned to overthrow as unscriptural. As the XXIInd article puts it: "The Romish doctrine of purgatory . . . is a fond thing vainly invented, grounded upon no certain warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God."

This conviction seems generally to have been held by Englishmen from the time of the Reformation down to the middle of the last century. One may recall the passage in *Lorna Doone* where the parson is reading the state prayers in a west-country church, and a messenger, arriving from London with the report of the King's death, conveys the news by protesting against prayer for the departed in a Protestant Church. Or again, just over a century ago, there was a Bishop of Ripon who delayed the consecration of St Saviour's, Leeds, because Dr Pusey, the anonymous donor, had caused an inscription to be written on the fabric with the dangerous words: "Pray for the sinner who built this church." The bishop had no guarantee that the sinner in question was alive, and even if he were, these words would become a prayer for the departed the moment he died! There were of course exceptions even before Newman "drove a coach and four" through the Articles in Tract No. 90. Archbishop Ussher wrote a defence of prayer for the departed, and Dr Johnson, we are told, was wont to practise it in his private devotions. But until the Oxford movement these were exceptions, and most Englishmen would have shared the horror of the Bishop of Ripon. Until the first World War, the practice must have seemed a High Church affectation, frowned upon by authority, and condemned by the old-fashioned Evangelicals. It was with this war, we are told, that the practice definitely "caught on" in the Church of England. A change of theological conviction, or a wave of sentimentality? It is not for us to judge, but it is legitimate to ask whether much of the prayer for the departed which goes on to-day is not due either to the unquestioning assumption that it is the "catholic" thing to do, or that it is just a "nice" thing. Meanwhile the Protestant underworld still protests, and not a few orthodox Anglicans, though not disposed to condemn the practice outright, are wondering how far it can be squared with the Articles without surrendering the essential Protestantism of the Church of England. It is among these last that the present writer found himself. And there seemed to be only one way out: to re-examine the teaching of the New Testament about the situation of the Christian dead, and to re-examine the Prayer Book in the light of that teaching.

Now, the first point to be noticed about the New Testament evidence for the state of the Christian departed is the complete

absence of any Greek doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Nowhere do we find the doctrine of σῶμα σῆμα, the doctrine that the soul is entombed in the body and awaiting friendly death to come and release it. Death, in the Bible, is not a friend, but an alien intruder, the wages of sin, the last enemy which shall be destroyed by the triumphant Christ and cast into the lake of fire. The fact that many Christians in modern times have believed in the immortality of the soul only shows how deeply non-biblical categories of thought have penetrated into our Christian thinking. The antithesis to death in the Bible is not immortality but resurrection. But here again there is a trap for the unwary. Traditional Christianity has managed for centuries to pay lip-service to the biblical formula of "resurrection" and yet to combine it with a Greek conception of immortality. In this combination, which Kirsopp Lake exposed in his *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul* a generation ago, resurrection becomes an individual resurrection to immortal life following upon each individual death. It is doubtless of such an individual resurrection which most modern Christians think when they say in the Creed: "I believe in the resurrection of the body." Protestants may write on their tombstones "At Rest," and Catholics *"Requiescat in pace."* But the difference between Protestant complacency and Catholic anxiety is in the last resort insignificant, for both commonly think of the destiny of the departed in individual terms. It cannot be asserted too emphatically that the New Testament never speaks of resurrection in purely individual and purely supra-temporal and supra-historical terms. In the New Testament doctrine of resurrection there are three historical moments (*kairoi*) of resurrection. First, and decisive, there is the resurrection of Christ on Easter Day. This is no survival of an individual immortal soul, but the raising of the Second Adam, the New Man, out of death. True, the Bible speaks of other raisings from the dead—*e.g.*, the miracles performed by Elijah and Elisha, and the raising by Jesus of the daughter of Jairus, of the son of the widow of Nain, and of Lazarus. But these were raised to the old life of the flesh. These all died again. The raising of Jesus is a wholly different event: He is raised a spiritual body, now to die no more. His resurrection marks the inauguration of the Age to Come, the fulfilment of the eschatological promise of God in the Psalms: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou suffer thy Holy One to see corruption" (Acts ii, 27). In this sermon St Peter goes on to speak of the second decisive moment in resurrection history: "Being therefore exalted to the right hand of God, and having received the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath poured forth this, which ye see and hear" (Acts ii, 33). This gift of the Spirit is intimately connected with the resurrection of Jesus. It is the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead (Rom. viii, 11). Through the possession of the Spirit the Christian community already shares in the resurrection life of Jesus here and now. "We were therefore buried with him through baptism [*i.e.*, in the Spirit-baptism, which continues the event of Pentecost in the life of the Church] into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead

through the glory of the Father, so we might also walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi, 4; *cf.* Col. ii, 12). But this present resurrection-life in the Spirit has also a future reference. The Spirit is the pledge, the firstfruits (Rom. viii, 23) of a resurrection which is to have its consummation in the future: "If we have become united with him by the likeness of his death, we *shall be* [note the future tense] by the likeness of his resurrection" (Rom. vi, 5).

The final decisive moment of resurrection is thus set in the future, and our present resurrection life is no more than an anticipation of that future. When does it occur? It is surprising that the New Testament never locates this resurrection at the death of each individual believer immediately after his death. Rather, it places the final resurrection at the last day, when Christ returns to the earth again in His power and glory. "Each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits [note the same word used here as is used of the present possession of the Spirit in Rom. viii, 23]; afterward they that are Christ's *at his coming*" (1 Cor. xv, 23). "For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God. And the dead in Christ shall rise first, and then we that are alive, that are left, shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air."

There are then, according to the New Testament, three *kairoi* in resurrection history—namely, Easter Day, Pentecost-Baptism, and the Parousia.

What then is the position of the dead in Christ in relation to this resurrection history? The whole argument of 1 Thess. iv and of 1 Cor. xv hinges upon the point that the death of the individual Christian does not essentially alter his position on the line of salvation history. Though they are dead, they still stand on the line between the two points of Pentecost and the Parousia. They still await, as we do who are yet alive, the final resurrection at the last day. They have *not yet* attained to the spiritual body. Death has affected them to this extent, that they are "unclothed." They have put off the body of the flesh. For death, though his power has been undermined by the resurrection of Christ, is not yet destroyed, and will not be destroyed until the *eschaton* (1 Cor xv, 26). Death still comes even to those who are in Christ and share His resurrection life. But the power of death has been undermined. Death cannot deprive the dead in Christ of their possession of the Spirit. And therefore they have the certainty that that life in the Spirit will blossom forth in its fullness at the *eschaton*. They will be "clothed upon" with the spiritual body (see the exposition in 2 Cor. v, 1-5). Meanwhile, the dead are spoken of as "asleep," asleep in Jesus (1 Thess. iv, 13, 14, 15). Like the penitent thief they are *with Him* in Paradise (cp. Phil. i, 23). They rest from their labours (not in the fussy busyness of "higher service," so dear alike to the restlessness and to the sentimentalism of our modern Christianity!). Their position, like that of the whole ecclesia since Pentecost, is still an "intermediate state," still awaiting the final consummation. Their cry is still, *"Quousque, domine?"* (Rev. vi, 10). They still pray, as we

that are left, "Maranatha, Come, Lord, come!" (1 Cor. xvi, 22; Rev. xxii, 17, 20). Their prayer, like ours, is still "Thy kingdom come."

I would contend that we have to take very seriously this biblical conception of time. We have become inured to the *Platonic* notion of the "infinitely qualitative distinction between time and eternity" (a phrase which can, however, be interpreted biblically), and to think of eternity as supra-spatially present. But the Bible thinks of eternity as *future*. Here are grave problems of theology and philosophy, problems which the present writer cannot pretend to be able to solve. But before we rush into "restatement in terms of modern thought," we have first to understand what the New Testament says. For an exhaustive exposition of the biblical conception of time the reader is referred to Professor Cullmann's *Christus und die Zeit*, to which, as will be seen, the present writer is deeply indebted.

This then is the theology of the New Testament about the state of the departed in Christ. The question now is whether this theology, so different from the medieval theories of purgatory and modern sentimentalities, is compatible with any kind of prayer for the departed. There is, so far as I can discover, but one example of such prayer in the New Testament, that in 2 Tim. i, 18: "the Lord grant unto him [Onesiphorus] that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day." It is not absolutely certain that Onesiphorus is dead, but the prayer for his "house" and the grateful memory of his services make better sense if Onesiphorus has recently died. If this presumption be true, the terms of this unique example in the New Testament of prayer for the departed are wholly consistent with what we learn of the situation of the dead in Christ elsewhere in the New Testament. This prayer is eschatologically orientated. It is prayer for mercy "in that day." Onesiphorus must face the last judgment, and the prayer is that he may pass through it to final resurrection: that he may be clothed upon with the spiritual body. It is not a prayer that he may "rest in peace"—more will be said of such prayers later—for according to the New Testament the departed are already "asleep in Jesus": they *do* rest from their labours. Hence prayer is directed not to their present state but to the future, to "that day" for which both living and departed, since they stand in the same position along the line of resurrection history, are waiting. Therefore in the last resort the substance of prayer for the departed is the same as prayer for the living. It is prayer for "mercy" (*cf.* verse 16 with verse 18), which is the full, final salvation of God.

Let us now turn to the prayers for the departed in the Book of Common Prayer. We are impressed at once by their scriptural reticence and sobriety. First, there is the Prayer for the Church in the Communion Service. Here occurs a thanksgiving: "And we also bless thy holy Name for all thy servants departed this life in thy faith and fear; beseeching thee to give us grace so to follow their good examples, that with them we may be partakers of thy heavenly kingdom." At first sight it looks as though there is no prayer for the departed here, but only a thanksgiving. If the dead are thought of as having already risen to eternal life, that would certainly be the case.

They would then be already partakers of God's heavenly kingdom, and the petition would be that we might be allowed to join them when we die. But, as we have seen, this individual conception of resurrection is not the doctrine of the New Testament. It would be more in accordance with that doctrine if we interpreted this prayer as a petition that *both the departed* (who are at present asleep in Jesus, and waiting the final consummation) and we who are still alive may at the last day together enter God's heavenly kingdom. The bidding which prefaces this prayer would seem to rule out this interpretation, but it must be remembered that the revisers intended the bidding to run: "Let us pray for the good state of the Catholic Church of Christ," and that this bidding, which they obviously intended should be in line with the commemoration of the departed which they were introducing simultaneously was withdrawn only in the final draft. So it would seem that the revisers really intended the Prayer for the Church to contain a petition for, as well as a commemoration of, the departed. And if they did, they did so in terms perfectly expressing the New Testament doctrine on the subject. There is also seventeenth-century evidence that the petition in the prayer of Oblation after the Communion of the people was interpreted as a prayer for the departed as well as for the living: "that . . . we and all thy whole Church may obtain remission of our sins and all other benefits of his passion." The phrase "all thy whole Church" is not without ambiguity, and it would be quite legitimate to refer it exclusively to the Church militant here on earth. But if the wider reference be allowed, it is perfectly consistent with what we saw was one characteristic of New Testament thought on the subject—namely, that the dead are, in relation to salvation history, in the same position as the living, and that therefore prayer for them is made in the same terms as prayer for the living.[1]

The two prayers in the Office for the Burial of the Dead are less ambiguous, and show that if there is a consistent doctrine running through the Prayer Book, our interpretation of the Prayer for the Church is correct. The first prayer runs ". . . that it may please thee of thy gracious goodness, shortly to accomplish the number of thy elect and to hasten thy kingdom, that we with all those that are departed in the true faith of thy holy Name may have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul in thy eternal and everlasting glory." Here it is quite clear that the departed, as well as the living, are waiting until God will accomplish the number of His elect; only then can they enter into perfect consummation and bliss. This prayer, like the theology of the New Testament, sets our thought of the departed in its proper context of eschatological urgency: "Maranatha!" "Thy kingdom come." Next there is the

[1] The words of administration are also worth noticing: "Preserve *thy body and* soul to everlasting life." True to the New Testament, the Prayer Book regards the life of the Spirit, which already quickens our mortal bodies, as an inalienable possession destined to be continued and consummated in everlasting life. I know of a modernist clergyman who omits the italicized words in administering communion!

Collect which, in agreement with the New Testament, asserts that the dead in Christ are now "asleep" and at "rest" in Him. Then comes the petition "that, at the general resurrection at the last day, we (that is, presumably, both the quick and the dead) may be found acceptable in thy sight; and receive that blessing which thy well-beloved Son shall then pronounce to all that love and fear thee, saying, Come, ye blessed children of my Father, receive the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world." Once again, the eschatological note dominates the whole prayer. Prayer for the departed, like prayer for the living, asks that they may find acceptance in the day of judgment and pass through resurrection into the final kingdom of God.

The 1928 Prayer Book has seen fit to include a versicle and a collect in which prayer is made that the departed may have rest and peace. As we have seen, there is no such prayer in the New Testament, and the 1662 book is true to the New Testament in its insistence that the departed *are* at rest because they are asleep in Jesus. Yet it would be wrong to rule out such prayer altogether, for after all it is a formula attested very early in Christian history, long before the medieval doctrine of purgatory. Such prayer would be perfectly legitimate, and not at all inconsistent with the New Testament insistence that the dead in Christ are asleep in Him, if the rest and the peace and the light for which they pray are the rest and the peace and the light which remain for the people of God at the last.

Finally, what of the Eucharist in this connexion? Provision for a Eucharist at a funeral and on All Souls' Day has been restored in the Revised Prayer Book of 1928. Now every Eucharist is, rightly understood, a Requiem, for every Eucharist is the Church's cry to God to bring in the Parousia. In the Eucharist, we show forth the Lord's death *till He come*. In the Eucharist we make before God an *anamnesis* of the great Christological events of the Incarnation, Passion, Resurrection, and Exaltation of the Messiah as the ground of our petition that the salvation history may be completed by the Second Advent of the Messiah. Every Eucharist is summed up in the cry "Maranatha," the cry that we *with them*, the dead in Christ, may have our perfect consummation and bliss in the eternal kingdom of God.[1]

This essay may fittingly conclude with two quotations from Archbishop Bramhall, which will illustrate how the best Anglican theology interpreted the Prayer Book in the seventeenth century, and also show the truly scriptural character of that theology:

[1] For this interpretation of the Eucharist the reader is referred to Joachim Jeremias, *Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu*, p. 117. Jeremias observes that the Eucharist is an *anamnesis*, not because it reminds the Church of the event of the passion, but because it calls upon God to remember what He has accomplished in Jesus Christ, by completing that work through the parousia. He aptly compares the eucharistic prayer in the Didache, 10, 5:

μνήσθητε, κύριε, της ἐκκλησίας σου τοῦ ῥύσασθαι αὐτὴν ἀπὸ πάντος πονηροῦ καὶ τελειῶσαι αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου, καὶ συναξον αὐτήν. . . εἰς τὴν σὴν βασιλείαν.

For a similar eschatological interpretation of the Eucharist compare Cullmann, *Urchristentum und Gottesdienst*.

"We condemn not all 'praying for the dead,' not for their resurrection, and the consummation of their happiness, but their (the Romanists') prayers for their deliverance out of Purgatory."

"That the souls (of the departed) may be helped to the consummation of their blessedness, and to a speedier union with their bodies by the resurrection thereof, they (the modern Greeks) do not deny, no more do we: we pray daily, 'Thy kingdom come,' and 'Come Lord Jesus, come quickly'; and 'that we, with this our brother and all other departed in the faith may have our perfect consummation and bliss both in body and soul'" (cited from *Hierurgia Anglicana*, 1904, Part III, pp. 148 f.).

REGINALD H. FULLER.

Theism and Thomism: Some Answers to Professor Emmet

IN an article in the December issue of THEOLOGY,[1] in which she did me the honour of discussing at length a recent book entitled *Existence and Analogy*, Professor Dorothy Emmet appealed to me "or some other modern Thomist" to remove what she modestly described as the "misunderstandings" of contemporary empirical philosophers, including herself, in relation to the traditional natural theology. In that article she gave two examples, one of which was taken from what must have been a rather disconcerting experience of her own at an international philosophical conference at Amsterdam, to indicate the almost complete lack of mutual understanding between Thomist philosophers and those of the modern empiricist type, and she rightly singled out the cosmological argument for the existence of God as the point at which the difficulty comes to a head. The situation is all the more perplexing because, as Miss Emmet remarks, "if the Thomist position is founded on an appeal to the 'natural reason,' in a contemporary discussion *contra Gentiles* the Thomist arguments should seem cogent to others besides those trained in that tradition." The question which she raises is, in fact, twofold. First, how are we to account for the fact that a process of reasoning which carries complete conviction to the Thomists carries no conviction to the modern empiricists? And secondly, this being the case, what is the significance of the further fact that, as a mere matter of history, the Thomist natural theology has grown up in the climate of Catholic Christianity?

Before going any further, a few words about terminology may help to prevent unnecessary confusion. I am not at all sure that the words "Thomist" and "empiricist," without further qualification, accurately describe the two parties to the debate. The word "Thomist" is, after all, capable of a great variety of applications. In the narrowest sense it is used to distinguish the teaching of St Thomas himself (interpreted in case of doubt by the great Domini-

[1] *Some Questions to a Modern Thomist*, vol. lii, No. 354, pp. 453 f.

can commentators Capreolus, Cajetan, and John of St Thomas) not merely from that of Cartesians, Hegelians, and modern empiricists, but also from that of other scholastics such as Bonaventura, Scotus, Ockham, Suarez, and their present-day representatives. In the widest sense it can be used to describe anybody who, basing his cosmology upon the principle *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, maintains in addition that the existence of the finite world apodictically indicates the existence of that self-sufficient transcendent cause to which Christian theology applies the name "God." It is this widest sense that Miss Emmet gives to the word "Thomist" in her article, and I shall follow her usage here; I am doubtful whether I am myself a Thomist in any narrower sense. I find it more difficult to decide what name to give to the other party to the discussion. "Empiricist" seems to me to be definitely misleading, for Thomists themselves can be accurately described as empiricists in contrast with Cartesians and most idealists. Since the main thesis of the non-Thomist party with which we are concerned here is the assertion that there is no rational necessity to proceed from the recognition of the existence of the world to the affirmation of the existence of a self-sufficient transcendent cause, I shall describe it by the term "positivist," without intending to include therein any of the further connotations that that term commonly carries at the present day.

It would, of course, be easy to write the Thomists off as the victims of wishful thinking. On the lowest level it might be pointed out that most Thomist philosophers are members of Roman Catholic religious orders and would find themselves in a very uncomfortable position if they abandoned the traditional point of view. On a slightly higher level it might be urged that they are the victims of a long process of intellectual conditioning in the course of their training and have in consequence become incapable of seeing glaring errors in the arguments with which they were then indoctrinated. It might also be suggested that the Thomists have been carefully protected from the demoralizing influence of modern philosophy and have therefore never discovered that their fortresses have been demolished by wreckers like Hume and Kant. In any case, it is manifest that all, or practically all, Thomistic philosophers are convinced adherents of the Christian religion, and it might well seem to be expecting too much of human nature to suppose that they would throw away such valuable defences of their position as the cosmological argument for the existence of God. If that argument were valid, how useful it would be! It is only a step from recognizing this fact to persuading oneself that so useful an argument cannot be false. In short, is not the Thomist's adherence to natural theology simply a glaring, but quite understandable, example of psychological rationalization?

I cannot help thinking that such explanations as these are rather too simple to meet the case. In the first place, it is simply not true that all Thomists are such by profession or education. M. Maritain came to St Thomas by way of Bergson,[1] and M. Gilson through his

[1] See the two essays on Bergson in *Redeeming the Time*.

studies in the historical background of Cartesianism.[1] Neither A. E. Taylor nor W. G. de Burgh could be accurately described as a Thomist in the narrower sense, but anyone who has read the essay by the former on *St Thomas as a Philosopher*[2] or the latter's posthumous work *The Life of Reason*[3] will know how close both of them came as time moved on to accepting the essential basis of Thomist theism. And if I may venture to add my own experience to that of men far more distinguished than myself, it is not on the face of it obvious that the intellectual discipline of the Cambridge Mathematical Tripos would be any more likely than that of the Oxford School of Litteræ Humaniores to predispose the student to the Thomist position or even to render him less capable of distinguishing a valid from an invalid argument. Nor, in view of the existence of the Louvain school (who are certainly Thomists in the wide, if not in the narrow, sense), is it plausible to associate the acceptance of Thomism with ignorance of post-medieval philosophy; such a philosopher as Maréchal, for example, while fully prepared to recognize all that is of value in the contributions of Hume and Kant, remained fully convinced of the essential validity of the traditional natural theology. And so far from Thomists being ready to grasp at any argument, sound or unsound, which might seem to provide a buttress for theism, one of the most striking features of the Thomist tradition (though it is not always easy to convince positivists of its existence) is its quite deliberate and sustained rejection of the ontological argument, which, were it valid, would be as convenient and valuable a support for Christian theism as one could well have.[4] It is, I would suggest, at least as likely, on antecedent grounds, that the positivist has been conditioned by his training to overlook an essential element in reality as that the Thomist has been conditioned by his training to see something in reality that is not there. And it is this which in fact I believe to be the case, and I think that its recognition will explain the puzzling fact that natural theology (in the sense in which Christian theism understands it), while professing to be a purely rational study, has, as a matter of history, grown up in the climate of the Christian revelation.

Both M. Gilson[5] and M. Maritain[6] have discussed at length the question of the possibility of a Christian philosophy; that is, the question how a philosophy, which is by definition an exploit of the human reason making no appeal to the deliverances of supernatural revelation, can be specifically Christian. If it has anything specially

[1] See the introduction to his book *God and Philosophy*.

[2] *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 224 f. *Cf.* also the essay on "The Vindication of Religion" in *Essays Catholic and Critical* (3rd ed., pp. 29 f.) and the article on "Theism" in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. xii, pp. 261 f.

[3] I have discussed this book at length in an article in *Laudate* (vol. xxvii, No. 87, July-Dec., 1949, pp. 13 f.).

[4] Incidentally, I do not think it is strictly accurate to describe a being "so bad that no worse could be conceived" as "the devil"; as Miss Emmet rightly suggests, for the ontologists (and, I would add, for the Thomists) such a thing is logically impossible. Even the devil is not as bad as that!

[5] *Christianisme et Philosophie*. *Cf. The Spirit of Mediæval Philosophy*, ch. i.

[6] *De la Philosophie chrétienne*.

to do with Christianity (the objection will run) it will not be philosophy but a branch of Christian theology, while if it is philosophy in the strict sense it cannot have anything in particular to do with Christianity; Christian philosophy is either not philosophy or it is not Christian, the very term "Christian philosophy" is a *contradictio in adjecto*. My own answer to this question, an answer which I believe to be in essence, if not in detail, the same as that of Maritain and Gilson, is that what the Christian revelation can do for the Christian philosopher is to direct his attention to an aspect of the world which without its assistance he is only too likely to overlook—namely, the entire contingency and dependence of the existence of all finite beings.

As Miss Emmet recognizes, the fundamental thesis of my book lay in the assertion of the radical distinction between essence and existence; essence can be conceptualized, but existence can only be affirmed. The assumption that existence can be included in the concept of an essence was the fallacy of the ontological argument. It is only if we ask why things exist, and not merely why they are the sort of things that they are, that we can arrive at the affirmation of the transcendent self-sufficient God of Christian theism. I feel sure, however—and this is a point about which my mind has become more definite since I wrote my book—that to get to the bottom of our present problem we must recognize that the Thomist and the positivist mean rather different things by the word "existence."

After all, the positivists themselves are as clear as anyone that existence is not a predicate. It was, I think, Lord Russell who first plainly pointed out the difference of logical structure between existential propositions such as "Lions exist" (There is an x such that x is leonine) and attributive propositions such as "Lions are carnivorous" (For any x, if x is leonine, x is carnivorous). Nevertheless, for the positivist, existence signifies occurrence and nothing more, the bare fact of "thereness," presence in the universe as contrasted with absence from it. And, as Hume rightly saw, from the mere occurrence of a particular nothing can be deduced about anything else. For the Thomist, on the other hand, or at any rate for the only kind of Thomist that I am prepared to defend (for the metaphysics of some so-called Thomists have been as spectral and glacial as that of any positivist), existence is an activity and is experienced as such. We do not find ourselves in a world composed of discrete particulars lying passively about as objects for our awareness, but in a world of active existents which enter into real causal relationship with us when we experience them. I can perhaps best make this point clear by reference to Whitehead's criticism of the Humians in *Process and Reality*,[1] which seems to me to be one of the most important sections of that difficult but brilliant book. For Whitehead, the fundamental error of the Humians was their assumption that perception took place simply in the mode of presentational immediacy; anything that could not be perceived as presentationally immediate could not be

[1] Part ii, ch. viii.

perceived (and so could not be known to exist) at all. Hence causality could be understood only as uniform sequence, and the validity of induction became a complete mystery. In fact, however, Whitehead insisted, perception occurs not only in the mode of presentational immediacy but also in the mode of causal efficacy; the plain fact is that we experience other existents as centres of activity which are ingredient into us by the influence which they exert upon us. The world is an organic whole of active centres contributing to one another's life. I am far from satisfied with Whitehead's account of the relation between the two modes of perception and with his theory of symbolic reference, so far as I understand them; still less would I wish to be committed to every detail of his metaphysical system. But on this main point he seems to me to be altogether right. It is because of the positivists' limitation of perception to presentational immediacy that they can find no place in their theory of knowledge for awareness either of God or persons, for neither God nor persons offer themselves to us with presentational immediacy; the most that the positivists can do for God or for persons is to interpret them as logical constructs out of presentational data, and this tendency reaches the extreme in the doctrine held by some of them that there is no intelligible difference between a real human being and a well-constructed robot.

The reason for this narrow interpretation of perception is not, I think, difficult to find. Philosophers quite naturally hanker after clear and distinct ideas and logically coercive demonstrations; to admit the fuzzy or the obscure would be to fall into the danger of slipshod thinking. So long as we are investigating the logical relations of clearly conceptualized entities we are safe; and it is precisely the presentationally immediate which is clearly conceptualizable. The positivist program follows as a matter of course. What, however, will be the result of this if there are important aspects of reality which are *not* clearly conceptualizable, which are known not by presentational immediacy but in the highly obscure mode of causal efficacy? In that case we shall have achieved a highly lucid knowledge of certain aspects of reality by completely neglecting others of equal or greater moment. We shall have acquired a brilliant superficial understanding of the world at the expense of an almost complete absence of depth. It is quite remarkable how many modern philosophers, while verbally rejecting Cartesianism, fall into the typically Cartesian error of limiting the scope of philosophy to the realm of the conceptual and of logic; Professor Gilbert Ryle's recent book *The Concept of Mind* provides a striking example of this. But, as de Burgh remarks, "it is Aquinas's merit that he recognizes that the supreme knowledge accessible to man is vague and confused (not, as Descartes held, clear and distinct); for all his logical acumen and precision of language, he refused to imprison the mind of man, after the model of modern logisticians, in cast-iron logical moulds."[1]

[1] *The Life of Reason*, p. 192.

What Christian theology, with its doctrine of God as a supreme activity of self-existent triune life and as the creator of all activity other than His own, can do for philosophy is therefore, as I see it, to direct the mind to precisely that characteristic of finite beings which the philosopher as such is most likely to overlook—namely, their status as exerting, each in its mode, the fundamental activity of *existing*. M. Gilson has exhibited at great length the perennial tendency of philosophers to attend to essences rather than to existence or to interpret existence as merely a kind of essence;[1] at the present day the tendency is perhaps rather, while recognizing the distinction between essence and existence, to interpret existence as mere occurrence instead of as activity. But unless we recognize that existence *is* activity, and indeed the fundamental activity of which all other activity is only an aspect, I do not see how natural theology can begin. It is, I think, significant that Dr Farrer in his great work *Finite and Infinite* felt bound to begin by making the equation between *esse* and *operari*.[2]

How precisely the transition is to be made from the apprehension of finite existents to the affirmation of an infinite self-existent as their creative cause is a matter on which, I think, modern Thomists would differ among themselves. The various types of argumentation which have been constructed for this purpose have, as I see it, the function not of demonstrating that the proposition "God exists" is a logical consequence of the proposition "Finite being exists," but of assisting the mind to look at finite beings in such a way as to recognize that in existing as finite existents they are in fact existing in dependence upon the creative will of an infinite self-existent. I do not think many people to-day are very much helped by St Thomas's Five Ways, though I am not sure that I am prepared to accept Dr Farrer's invitation to pour the Five Ways down the drain and rejoice at having done so;[3] they may be helped more by de Burgh's three ways[4] or by Dr Farrer's thirteen.[5] But I am quite sure that what is really needed in natural theology is not so much brilliance in logical analysis as the power to look at finite beings and see them as they really are, and this is a capacity which most modern philosophical technique tends rather to inhibit than to develop.[6]

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[1] *Cf. L'Être et l'Essence, passim* (English version, *Being and some Philosophers*).

[2] P. 21.

[3] In a broadcast talk on September 27, 1949.

[4] *The Life of Reason*, p. 189.

[5] *Finite and Infinite*, pp. 262 f.

[6] I think this may go some way to meet Miss Emmet's criticisms of my use of the notion of cause in relation to creation and of the notion of "creation out of nothing"; I should say that all our perception of finite secondary causality can be at the same time a perception of God's primary causality, if only we know how to perceive it. Miss Emmet writes: "Instead of drawing the distinction between rational and revealed theology as Thomists draw it, a Christian theologian should make clear that he is analysing and attempting to make intelligible certain ways of thinking which have grown up within the Jewish-Christian tradition." I agree with the second part of this sentence, but I should add that these ways of thinking are ways which, when brought to bear upon the world, discover something about it which would in all probability otherwise have been overlooked.

I must now comment on some particular points in Professor Emmet's article. She quotes me accurately as maintaining that "existence is not a predicate" and therefore cannot be the subject of a *concept*, but only of a *judgment* or *assertion*, but she takes this as implying that "to say that the meaning of God is 'He Who Is' is equivalent to asserting that He is." I cannot see that this follows. What does follow is that to say that the meaning of God is "He Who Is" (*i.e.*, self-existent being) involves asserting that, *if God exists*, He exists independently of anything else (*i.e.*, self-existently), but that is all. Miss Emmet proceeds: "But what sort of concept is it of which the *meaning* is the same as an existential assertion or, in Thomist language, in which 'essence and existence' are one? It can only be one which has extension but no intension, and we are left completely agnostic as to *what* we are asserting 'is.'" But, surely, the *meaning* of God is not an existential assertion, although the assertion that God exists is. The meaning of God does, I admit, *involve* an existential assertion, but it is the purely hypothetical one to which I have just referred. Even the meaning of "dependent being" involves a *hypothetical* existential assertion—namely, that *if* dependent being exists, it exists in dependence on some other being or beings. There does not seem to be any particular difficulty here, but I think perhaps Professor Emmet and I differ in our understanding of the assertion that in God essence and existence are identical. I certainly do not take it as meaning that God exists because He is the kind of being that He is, as if His existence (*ut exercita*) followed from His essence, but rather that the kind of being He is (namely, self-existent being) follows from the way in which He exists (namely, self-existently). In saying that God exists self-existently, you have said that about Him from which everything else that is true about Him flows; whereas, in contrast, when you say that a finite being exists dependently, its nature remains undetermined. For there are an infinite number of ways of being a finite being, and indeed of being any particular finite being, but only one way of being God.[1]

Again Miss Emmet writes: "It might be said that, though any part of the world looked at in isolation may seem contingent, seen in its context in nature as a whole it is not contingent, and that nature as a whole may be the necessary being." I fully agree that the words "contingent" and "necessary" have more than one meaning, and that, as it is sometimes presented, the argument *e contingentia mundi* rests upon a sheer equivocation. I think St Thomas realized this when, in the *Tertia Via*, having argued to the existence of some necessary being, he then distinguished between necessary being which derives its necessity from some other being and necessary

[1] I think I have perhaps insufficiently emphasized the fact that, while existence *ut exercita* cannot be conceptualized, existence *ut signata* does behave in some respects like a concept (*Existence and Analogy*, p. 50); this is one of the queer things about existence. In defining God as *ipsum esse subsistens* we are including existence in a quasi-concept, but only hypothetically (*i.e.*, we are saying: "*If* God exists, He is a being that exists self-existently"); we are not asserting His actual existence.

being having its necessity in itself.[1] Miss Emmet continues: "I believe that it is true that if you just take the fact of existence for granted, and are not struck by there being a mystery in it, you are unlikely to be religious and that this gives a real starting-point for religious thinking." I fully concur; if you just take anything for granted you will never get anywhere. If mathematical physicists had just taken the Michelson-Morley experiment for granted, we should be without the Theory of Relativity. The trouble with the positivist is that he does just take existence for granted, for reasons which I have tried to indicate. I would only add a word to draw attention to what I said about "wonder" in *Existence and Analogy*.[2] When Miss Emmet adds to the sentence which I have just quoted: "It is a long way from this to say that the cosmological argument is intelligibly demonstrated," I think she is quite right, in the sense which I take her to give to "demonstration." It seems clear to me that the proposition "God exists" can be derived from the sense-certified proposition "contingent being exists," by a purely logical process, only if one is quite unscrupulously equivocal in one's use of the words "contingent" and "necessary." As I have argued elsewhere,[3] the logical process involved in the argument is quite trivial. The real difficulty lies in recognizing finite beings as what they really are; it is this that the positivist fails altogether to do.

I wish that I had space adequately to discuss Professor Emmet's very interesting remarks about Thomist epistemology. I am not particularly attached to the details of the traditional Thomist presentation (using "Thomist" here in the narrow sense), but I agree with her that the really important element in it is the distinction between the *objectum quo* and the *objectum quod*, between the whole machinery, physical and psychological, by means of which we perceive beings other than ourselves and the beings themselves that we perceive. I think it is likely that the traditional account treats the *species sensibilis* rather too much as if it were a Lockean primary quality. It may also be the case that it treats the ultimate cognitional element in perception, the part played by the *intellectus possibilis*, too much as if it were bare awareness of a presentational datum; I am not altogether sure about this. But I do not think the necessary supplementation is given by Kantian epistemology. I do not think that the main stress should fall on the activity of the mind in working up for itself an intelligible object, but upon the activity of the intelligible object, the extra-subjective being in its existential reality, in impinging upon the percipient; Whitehead seems to me to be nearer the truth than Kant. And whatever may be true about Aristotle, I do not think that St Thomas viewed the abstractive activity of the intellect in perception as simply the abstraction of a specific essence, shared by the object in question with other objects in the physical world. Of course abstraction takes no account of the

[1] But I am not sure, even so, that St Thomas's presentation of the *Tertia Via* is altogether satisfactory; see *He Who Is*, p. 47, n. 1.

[2] P. 85.

[3] *He Who Is*, pp. 72 f.

concrete *thereness* of the abstracted essence, but the essence which is abstracted is the individual essence, not the specific one, in the biological sense of "specific"; in perceiving Socrates it is "Socrateity" (*i.e.*, manhood embodied in Socrates, not bare manhood) that is abstracted. And since the perceiving subject is not a mere intelligence, but a human being who has senses as well as intellect, the total object of perception is not even Socrateity, but Socrates himself. So I do not think that St Thomas's doctrine of perception is so necessarily bound up with biological views about fixity of species as Miss Emmet suggests. It seems clear to me that for the Angelic Doctor the question of real kinds is far more an empirical than a metaphysical question. He believed that in the case of the angels there were no species at all in the biological sense; every individual angel was unique in kind and the specific and individual essence were identical. In the material world, on the other hand, it is clear that individuals fall into fairly well-marked classes and that *equus generat equum*; nevertheless, as I have urged elsewhere,[1] for St Thomas the doctrine of form and matter, the function of which is to account for the occurrence of beings which are similar to one another, is altogether secondary to the doctrine of essence and existence. If God had created (as He very well might have done) a universe consisting entirely of angels, the duality of form and matter would be absent, but the duality of essence and existence would remain.[2] So I do not find any difficulty in agreeing with the important point made by Miss Emmet, when she writes: "I think we can avoid nominalism if we allow that it is an empirical fact that some things resemble some things more than they resemble others, and we may also be able to say that these resemblances are the result of causal properties in the things concerned, and that this gives us a certain objective justification in the use of class-concepts." I think, however—and here I hope Miss Emmet would agree with me—that this involves accepting causality in something like the full-blooded Whiteheadian sense and not in the spectral sense of either the Humians or the Kantians.[3]

I am very conscious of the inadequate character of these comments, which are certain in any case to appear too Thomist for most moderns and too modern for many Thomists. Whatever may be our judgment upon some post-medieval philosophers, I am sure that we cannot afford simply to bypass modern philosophy as such. And I

[1] *Existence and Analogy*, pp. 56 f.

[2] As I suggested in *Existence and Analogy*, pp. 58 f., I believe that the form/matter duality applies in very different analogical modes to the various levels of created beings. Some fairly strongly realistic view of form seems to me to be necessary in the case of man, in order to explain the evangelical doctrine of redemption. But this is a theological, not a philosophical, consideration.

[3] I am not very happy about Miss Emmet's doctrine of "systematic distortion" in perception (*Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, p. 91). If we can recognize the distortion as such, it would seem to follow that what is distorted must be an *objectum quo*, through which we can know, obscurely perhaps but undistortedly, the *objectum quod*. But I would admit that Thomists have sometimes talked as if the *objectum quod*, the extra-mental thing, was rather like one of Locke's substances, some, though not all, of whose qualities were precisely like those of the sense-impression.

think that, in spite of a rather exaggerated wide-heartedness which led him to chase all the hares and run with all the hounds, and in spite of certain features (such as his doctrine of God) which seem to me to be equally unsatisfactory from a theological and from a metaphysical point of view, it is Whitehead from whom the modern Thomist may perhaps receive most help in disentangling the essentials of the *philosophia perennis* from its purely accidental historical trappings. But it seems to me to be the tragedy of Whitehead's work that the only great philosopher to whom he apparently never paid any serious attention is St Thomas Aquinas.

E. L. Mascall.

American Letter: No. 6

REFLECTIONS AFTER A CONVENTION

I.—Thanks to the joint influence of history and geography, the American Church combines in a triennial General Convention the equivalents of several bodies in the Church of England which meet annually or more often. It is as if the Church Assembly and the two Convocations, and for good measure the governing bodies of S.P.G. and C.M.S., all met together once in three years and transacted their business in two hectic weeks. As each Convention comes around those who are interested in such things are led to reflect on the merits and anomalies of our ecclesiastical organization—usually forming desires for improvements which we forget until another Convention is upon us and it is too late to do anything about it. It may seem out of the way to use an American Letter to England as the occasion for assembling thoughts on the American General Convention. But our ecclesiastical constitution is of some interest as reflecting certain aspects of American life, and also as illustrating questions likely to arise in one form or another when the attempt is made to combine the principles of Catholic order with those of representative government.

The Constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America is, like its name, a legacy of the eighteenth century. Our Federal Constitution also comes from that period, and was indeed put into effect in the same year, 1789. Recently the United States Supreme Court decided a question of constitutional law largely on the basis of conclusions (incorrect, in the present writer's opinion) about the intentions of Thomas Jefferson in promoting the separation of Church and State in Virginia in the 1780s. I doubt if other countries could easily produce parallels to this piece of political patristics. Similarly, exposition of our ecclesiastical constitution involves one in discussion of the principles of Bishops White and Seabury in the same period. To the former we owe lay representation in Diocesan and General Conventions, to the latter the existence of a separate House of Bishops (which must not, however,

be called the upper house, at least in the presence of members of the House of Deputies), and so on.

From the Continental Congresses of the American Revolution we inherit the principle of equal representation (also retained in the United States Senate), and voting by delegations, which the Federal Constitution abandoned. Changes in the Prayer Book or the Constitution of the Church require a vote by orders and delegations, and the lay or clerical delegation of any diocese may demand one on other matters. Dioceses are entitled to four delegates in each order, with one vote in a vote by orders; Missionary districts have one delegate in each order, with a quarter-vote. Split delegations are in effect counted in the negative, since a majority of positive votes is required. We would scarcely create such a system now, but the recent Convention refused to change it, rejecting a proposal to count split delegations half-and-half. However, the majority was not very large ($35\frac{3}{4}$ and $34\frac{1}{4}$ in each order, with eight clerical and nine lay delegations divided), and this change may well be made shortly. The principle of diocesan representation, however, is likely to remain.

Another legacy of the days when General Convention was founded is that women have never been admitted to its membership. In 1946 one diocese elected a woman deputy on the ground that the term "laymen" should now be understood as including women, and in 1949 two others followed its example. But the House refused to seat them, and defeated decisively a proposal to allow one woman in each diocesan delegation—$28\frac{1}{2}$ for and $35\frac{1}{2}$ against in the clerical order, with 16 delegations divided, and $24\frac{3}{4}$ for to $46\frac{1}{4}$ against in the lay order, with 7 divided. However, a Commission of bishops, presbyters, laymen, and women has been set up to consider the place of women in the councils of the Church and report at the next Convention in 1952. So probably in due time something will be done. The important place of women in the life of the Church, and the significance of the Women's Auxiliary which meets concurrently with General Convention, are in favour of securing them some share in its formal deliberations.

American conservatism is illustrated by our retention of such "checks and balances," even when somewhat anomalous, in our ecclesiastical as in our civil government. But in some ways the General Convention is remarkably untrammelled. The organizers of the American Church assumed that it was a federation of Dioceses, as the nation of states, each retaining all rights except those yielded to the central body. However, in its early days General Convention was so informal, and its proceedings so unambitious, that it never bothered to enshrine this principle in its Constitution. Nor did it commit itself to any statement of the fundamental principles of the Church except as implied in the adoption of an American Prayer Book (1789) and some years later (1801) of a slightly revised form of the Articles of Religion. On the face of the Constitution General Convention is limited only by the provision that changes in the Constitution or Prayer Book must be approved by two successive Conventions. The clerical promise of conformity is to "the Doctrine,

Discipline, and Worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America," and it might become an interesting question of conscience what would happen to this obligation in case the Convention should make some essential change in the standards set forth. A century ago the leading ecclesiastical lawyer of the time, Murray Hoffman, suggested that the only check on the powers of General Convention was that created by the essential power of bishops to perpetuate their succession. Fortunately we have suffered only one schism on this basis (led by the single bishop who organized the Reformed Episcopal Church in 1873) and the example is not likely to be followed. Meanwhile for guarantee of our essential Anglican orthodoxy we have to draw heavily on the statement which has appeared in the preface to each American Prayer Book, that "this Church is far from intending to depart from the Church of England in any essential point of doctrine, discipline, and worship." It does not seem that we in practice are any less loyal to our heritage than we would have been if bound to it by more formal definition. We did some years ago depose a retired bishop for false doctrine (an unfortunate man who had come to believe in God only in a symbolic sense), and the Prayer Book seemed quite adequate as a point of reference.

II.—Our periodic Conventions tempt us to expect that the Church will be lost or saved according as the issues which seem crucial at the moment are decided one way or another at this meeting. For three Conventions such an attitude almost became a habit, since a resolution passed rather casually in 1937 had committed us to engaging in unity discussions with the Presbyterians; and at each Convention proposals were brought forward which were viewed with eager hope or serious alarm as the case might be, and in the end were treated with the customary Anglican discretion. On the whole we welcomed the absence of any such crisis at the recent Convention, since the Commission on Approaches to Unity was able to make interim proposals which were generally acceptable. It perhaps illustrates an American trait that arrangements for the practical work of the Church bulked large in the proceedings of the Convention. Besides the matters of procedure which have been mentioned, the only votes by orders called for in the House of Deputies were on propositions relating to the administration of Holy Communion. For the benefit of the isolated priest in a large parish (and for some weaker brethren) the House followed the bishops in agreeing that intinction might be permitted. But clergy and laity alike voted by considerable majorities against licensing laymen to administer the chalice.

In a country where the presentation of the alms is often the most solemn moment of divine service it is not suprising that the adoption of a budget should be an important part of an ecclesiastical gathering. Nor is it difficult to think of our Church's budget in personal terms. It represents, on the one hand, the Church's call to her members to offer part of their lives through the medium of money to her common work; on the other hand, the outreach of the Church's mission into human lives both at home and abroad. Plan-

ning for expansion in some areas, and turning into the budget some items which have been handled as special appeals, the Convention voted to work for a budget of $5,600,000 in each of the next three years. This means that it ventured to count on an increase of about 25 per cent. in giving for the work of the national Church—about $1 more annually from each communicant, which does not seem excessive. In proportion to resources we must still, I believe, note that the missionary societies of the Church of England are better supported than the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the American Church, which is another name for the Church itself in official action.

Three items in the enlarged budget are of particular interest. Overseas missions account for nearly two-fifths of it, which marks the Church's determination to advance in spite of all present difficulties. Provision is made for beginning, with three priests and a teacher, a mission on the island of Okinawa, which became of so much interest to Americans during the war. Secondly, the special appeal made for some years for the Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief is replaced by an item under the same name in the regular budget. Thirdly, the allotment for Christian Education has been almost tripled (to $341,000) to carry out the energetic program planned and begun by the present Director of that Department, the Rev. John Heuss. This results from a campaign begun some years ago by the Bishop of Western Michigan for more serious attention to this important field. Dr Heuss and his assistants are undertaking the preparation of a standard curriculum of religious instruction, to cover all ages from kindergarten to adults, along with increased preliminary and "in-service" training of the clergy and others who will be the actual educators in the parishes and other units of church life. The work is significant beyond its immediate field, since it has already had remarkable success in showing what a Church as varied as ours can do by way of producing a solid body of positive Anglican teaching. It may turn out to be the means of a practical answer to the desire of the Commission on Unity for greater unity and understanding within our own household.

III.—Mention of a Director and a Department brings us to note the quasi-commercial forms of organization which are likely to be found in any American activity. We are, as a friend of mine once observed, the first part of the Catholic Church to find a place for a vice-president in its organization. But it must have been as startling when medieval bishops first equipped themselves with chancellors and other such officials unknown to the ancient canons. In church as in state Americans seem to want personal leadership, as long as the external trappings of authority can be kept down and the executive kept surrounded by a framework of boards and committees. The formal executive organ of the Church as missionary society is the National Council, composed of sixteen members elected by General Convention (four bishops, four priests, and eight laymen), one (of any order) by each of the eight provinces (of which I cannot here speak particularly), and four by the Women's Auxiliary, to-

gether with its officers—the Presiding Bishop, chosen by Convention, as president, and two vice-presidents and a secretary chosen by itself. The working agencies are the Departments of the Council (Home, Overseas, Education, Social Relations, Promotion, and Finance), each with a Director.

But increasingly we expect the Presiding Bishop to unify and guide these activities, though technically they might go on if he did nothing but preside at certain meetings. The office has developed since it became elective in 1925. As the Canons now stand the Presiding Bishop is elected by his colleagues (subject to approval, more or less formal, by the House of Deputies), relinquishes his own Diocese, and serves until retirement at the Convention following his sixty-eighth birthday. An assistant of episcopal rank is usually found for him—at present, which may become a precedent, a former missionary bishop is vice-president of the National Council and director of its Overseas Department. Each of the five elected Presiding Bishops has found the responsibilities of the office a severe strain, and it may be better if we can define them more carefully and make more definite delegation possible. Canonically the Presiding Bishop is not a primate, but the organ of the joint primacy of the House of Bishops and President of the National Council; in practice his responsibilities and labours are as serious as those of any prelate in Christendom.

EDWARD R. HARDY, JR.

Jesus or Barabbas—Who Chose?

ONE of the things that is always held up to the devout Christian mind as a source of wonder and astonishment is the fickleness of the crowd which acclaimed Jesus as Messiah with shouts of joy on Palm Sunday, listened eagerly to Him through Holy Week as He taught daily in the Temple, and then clamoured for His death on Good Friday, crying, "Crucify Him, crucify Him." It is a matter often referred to in the sermons, and even the commentaries, of the pious and learned. In one of Dean Church's sermons come these words: "When the multitudes whom He had fed, and healed, and loved, raised the cry, 'Crucify Him.'" In the Clarendon Bible Series, on St Mark xv, 13, is the single comment: "Mere fickleness or the mob's lust for violence?" And other comments in the same vein are too numerous to quote. But does this universally accepted idea correspond with the facts as far as we are able to ascertain them? The question turns on who were the mob, or the multitude, or crowd, or "the Jews," who answered Pilate's query, "Will ye therefore that I release unto you the King of the Jews?" and said, "Not this man, but Barabbas." Were they in any respect the same as the crowds who had acclaimed Jesus earlier, and whose eager support for Him the Sadducees and rulers of the people so greatly feared?

According to the most probable reconstruction of the events the trial took place before Pilate early in the morning. St John's Gospel

says that the judgment was given about the sixth hour, and Westcott gives convincing reasons for thinking that he follows the use of Asia Minor in counting the hours from midnight and midday, rather than the Roman or Palestinian use of counting them from 6.0 a.m. or p.m. This would agree with St Mark's statement that the crucifixion took place at the third hour, which would be according to the Jewish reckoning. It is difficult to think that a large and representative crowd would have gathered by that hour. The chief priests and elders feared the people, and would not be anxious to attract public attention. The only way in which ordinary folk would become aware of what was happening would be through seeing Jesus led from the house of Caiaphas to the Prætorium. Even in the East, where people get up earlier than in England, there are not many people in the streets before six o'clock on a cold spring morning. It had been cold enough the night before for Peter to overcome natural shyness and mix with strangers to warm himself in front of their fire. Those who would be about would be people busy with their own affairs and with little time to turn to public events, even if they did recognize Jesus being led through the streets by the soldiers. It is difficult to see that the crowd could have contained more than a sprinkling of ordinary folk.

The place, again according to the Fourth Gospel, was outside the Prætorium, and there is nothing in the synoptics to cast doubt on this. Indeed, the reason given, that the Jews did not want to be contaminated for the Passover by going inside, makes it a most convincing probability. We have no clue as to how large a space this would be, and how large a crowd would be needed to convince Pilate that they spoke for "the people." When the final sentence was given from the judgment seat at a place called the Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha, we are told only that the chief priests answered, "We have no king but Cæsar." It may well be that quite a moderate number would have been sufficient to pass as a crowd. Who were this number? St Mark uses the same word, translated multitude, to describe them as he uses for those who came to arrest Jesus the night before. Might they not have been the same men? St Mark describes them as a "multitude with swords and staves from the chief priests and the scribes and the elders." St John says they were a "band of soldiers, and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees . . . with lanterns and torches and weapons." Hastings' *D.C.G.* in the article on "Arrest" suggests soldiers and "temple-servants." These might well include private retainers of the chief priests who were kept to lend a hand in any shady business that might arise and given a mainly nominal job about the house. A few would be kept in permanent employ and would hire more from the offscourings of the city as occasion demanded. There is plenty of parallel for this in Middle Eastern cities to-day, and no doubt in Eastern Europe as well. If this conjecture is right then it is easy to account for the enthusiasm with which they called for the release of Barabbas. Many of them might be guilty of similar crimes themselves. This, however, is pure surmise, but it does not alter the fact

that it is hard to see how any representative collection of ordinary people could be gathered at that hour. If not in this way, then probably in some other way, the chief priests and elders manufactured their own crowd.

It is much easier to think that Pilate, in his weakness, was manœuvred into condemning Jesus by the chief priests and rulers supported by a hired gang, without any real expression of the people's will, and that the people's hopes in Jesus and support for Him had not yet been extinguished. St Luke appears to have held that opinion, for he says that Jesus was followed to His crucifixion by "a great multitude of the people and of women who bewailed and lamented him." His popularity and prestige did not vanish in a moment; it died down gradually, but, unorganized and unled, it was not able to arrest the schemes of the ruling clique. By degrees the ordered routine of Jewish life and religion reasserted its sway over the people. When the time of Pentecost was come, it was only those on whom Jesus had made a particularly vivid impression who were aroused again by the Apostles' triumphant assertion that He had risen from the dead. God wants only wholehearted followers.

Later, when the Apostles and first Christians were deeply mystified by the Jews' rejection of the Messiah, they began to search for signs and foretellings of this rejection. Every early hint of it is worked up. The Gospel commentary on the parable of the sower is one example. St Peter, in his first speech in Acts, at Pentecost, merely says, "Him . . . ye, by the hand of lawless men did crucify and slay," but by the time of the healing by the gate called Beautiful—we know not how much later—he says, "His Servant Jesus, whom ye delivered up and denied before Pilate." It would need only the change of a word or two, which could easily have been made quite unconsciously during the oral period, to change the impression given by the trial story, and more is often read into the Gospel words than they will really hold.

J. E. D'Aeth.

An Ecumenical Conversation on the Mother of God

All conversations "across the frontiers" have a rare importance at the present time. Accordingly we welcome the appearance of an Anglican-Orthodox symposium of lectures given at the Summer School theological conference of the Fellowship of SS. Alban and Sergius in 1948.[1] Fr Thornton, Dr Mascall, and the Rev. T. M. Parker contribute papers on the Mother of God in Scripture, dogma, and devotion respectively. Professors Lossky and Florovsky expound Orthodox Mariology in two papers which advantageously overlap. There is also a fine devotional address on the theme by the Archimandrite Lev Gillet.

[1] *The Mother of God,* ed. E. L. Mascall, Dacre Press, 6s.

On the Orthodox side, Lossky begins by affirming that the extreme veneration of Mary by the Orthodox rests entirely on tradition. Taken by themselves, the Scriptures do not prove but rather seem to contradict it, nor can the conciliar Christological dogma of the *Theotokos* alone support it (p. 25). "Apart from Church tradition, theology would be dumb, and unable to justify this astounding glorification" (p. 26).

The main stem of the tradition here is the contrast, first found in Justin and Irenæus, between the "two virgins," the first and second Eve, disobedient and obedient. Both Lossky and Florovsky insist that Mary was born and lived under the law of original sin, the representative of a fallen race (pp. 31, 59). If she *anticipated* that grace and redemption which was hers and all the saints' at Pentecost, it was by God's free gift, not in virtue of the natural connexion which linked her to the God-man (pp. 32, 56, 59). Why then does the Church exalt her above the Seraphim? Because there was a compensation of holiness in her person adequate to her function, since she is still the Mother of God the Word (pp. 33, 63). Both writers end by emphasizing the mystery in which the Mother of God is veiled, and the propriety of a prudent silence, a note regrettably absent from the Anglican essays in this book (pp. 35, 63).

One's Mariological conclusions depend upon the way one approaches the subject. We must be grateful to Professor Lossky for laying bare that crucial division between us and his communion: our different attitudes to Church tradition. For the Orthodox the tradition has the authority of the continuous inspiration of the Holy Spirit: to appeal from the tradition to the Scriptures in order to indicate the serious possibility of unwarranted statements and interpretations or positive errors in it would be to impugn its authority: so theology is cumulative. The Anglican attitude to tradition is not without deference, but insists that it may well be in error: it must be "proved by the Scripture" and subjected to free theological scrutiny and argument: theology is not cumulative but reformable. This is plain both from the second question in the "Ordering of Priests," and Articles VI, XIX, XX, XXI, as also from the consistent practice of Anglican theologians of all parties since the Reformation. And we persist in this attitude, not because we are already deifying our own post-Reformation tradition, but because the attitude seems to us to be theologically reasonable. It consists of obedience to the evidence, and a willingness to say "not proven" when necessary. As Dr Mascall says in this book, "An Anglican is not committed to believing anything because it is Anglican, but only because it is true" (p. 50). An Anglican indeed must *submit* to the truth, believing that, even though he would crave more light, he has enough to walk by.

It is easier to state the Anglican approach than Anglican conclusions. Plainly, for Anglicans Mariology cannot shelter under the wing of tradition. The theologian who ventures here must not assume and expound, but examine and prove.

Before turning to the Anglican papers in this book, let us glance

at the evidence for ourselves. The Scripture yields us neither the grim and nervous silence of Protestantism nor the Mariolatry of the fully developed "Catholic" cultus. It propounds a *via media* of its own, if only we will submit to it and let it speak. On the one hand, there are the contents of the first two chapters of Matthew and Luke. She did indeed become the Mother of the Lord: *laus deo!* On the other hand, in striking contrast, the Gospels recall only four other incidents: the caution followed by the miracle at Cana (John ii); the occasion when His mother and His brethren seek Him, and He answers, "Behold my mother and my brethren! for whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother" (Mark iii, 31 f.; Matt. xii, 46 f.; Luke viii, 19 f.); the reply to the woman in the crowd who blessed His mother, "Yea, rather blessed are they that hear the Word of God and keep it" (Luke xi, 28); and lastly, as Mary watches her Son die, the hard command to exchange Him for a disciple, "Woman, behold thy son!" (John xix, 26). It is nowhere recorded that Christ addressed Mary as "Mother." She is noted as there with the disciples in the upper room awaiting Pentecost (Acts i, 14). The N.T. says nothing more.

If these passages mean anything, they mean that she who had been most highly favoured was called to give up most, she who was most privileged had to accept God's plan to exalt and glorify equally with her all His disciples. Mary's glory lies precisely in this, her "lowliness": she who was the Mother of God had a cross proportionate to her privilege, a cross beyond our conceiving, separation from Him who was both her flesh and the Eternal Word. "Yea, a sword shall pierce through thine own soul also" (Luke ii, 35). Not that He loved her less, but that He sought all with the love He had for her: and that meant for Him the road to Calvary, and for her, taking her place with the other disciples.

In support of this biblical picture there are two general theological considerations. First, there is an ambiguity about "motherhood" which I have never seen admitted by "Western Catholic" theologians. From my conception to the latter end of my adolescence I remain *dependent* upon my mother in various ways, too obvious to mention. But the time comes when that dependence ends.[1] My mother does not thereby cease to be my mother, nor do I cease to owe to her that deep affection which is proper. But the relationship must be altered when I grow up. The apron-strings must be loosed, and the person who stays tied to them we rightly pity. What happens to us must have happened to Him who took our nature from Mary: "the child *grew*" (Luke ii, 40, 52); this too was part of "the sword." This consideration makes sense of the biblical data. It also raises the terrible questions, how far "Catholic" insistence on a "dependence relationship" with Mary has obscured the real "adult mother" relationship within the one communion of the redeemed around the throne, and how far is such a "dependence relationship" the spiritual projection of retarded adolescence? We are indeed her sons in Him.

[1] *Vide* Gen. ii, 24; Matt. xix, 5; Eph. v, 31.

But He is grown up! How much is the Father *now* using Mary to mediate graces to the One Mediator?

The second point is more tentative. Must we insist that our Lord took flesh from Mary's already spotless human nature? Or (to borrow a key-word from the Orthodox) are such statements to be allowed only as poetical *anticipations*? Is it not better to say that the Word in His Incarnation perfected a flesh which before that union and apart from that union was our fallen and imperfect nature? Our theology here *must* leave room for such real growth from innocence to maturity as involved real facing and overcoming of temptations by the Word in His flesh. "We have not a high priest that cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one that hath been in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. iv, 15; *vide* Westcott *ad loc.*).

I believe that by this route of "obedience to the evidence" the Anglican may be led to a real point of contact with both Orthodox and "Western Catholic" devotion to Mary, while rejecting the extravagances and errors of the tradition. She is truly "Mother of God" as the Councils safeguard the term. She is in a sense the mother of the saints, with whom she was at one before God on the day of Pentecost. *Non mater nutrix, sed mater vero emerita:* as such we "call her blessed." And the mystery of her present state is something not yet revealed.

The writer has finished his interruption into this ecumenical conversation. It is now time to set out, as far as possible in their own words, the contributions of the theologians who represent Anglicanism in this book, that we may see whether what they say springs from the Anglican approach or not. Dr Mascall's paper begins by insisting that orthodox Christology requires us to acknowledge Mary's unique moral and physical role in the Incarnation: she was *Theotokos*. He then asserts (1):

> "Because Christ is still man, the relation of mother to son which began when Mary conceived him in her womb continues and will continue to all eternity. . . . By our baptism we were incorporated into the human nature which was formed in her womb, and in our communions we are fed with that same human nature. . . . The Christian returning from his communion can repeat in a totally new sense the words of Adam, 'The woman gave me and I did eat' " (pp. 42-3).

(Such an "ontological motherhood," "not an exuberance of devotion but a fact of theology," makes us *dependent* upon Mary *now* as mediatrix of graces.)

(2) About beliefs "to which Scripture makes no clear and unambiguous reference" (p. 44), Mary's immaculate conception, freedom from original and actual sin, perpetual virginity, and corporal assumption, Dr Mascall has no doubts, though he is prepared to allow that they are not *de fide* but only *proxima fidei*.

> "But if anyone presumes to declare as a truth divinely revealed that Blessed Mary was *not* perpetually virgin, or that she committed actual sin, or that her body was not assumed into heaven there to be united with her soul in an anticipation of the general resurrection (and I have heard

> Anglicans in effect make such an assertion) he is teaching *a fond thing vainly invented and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God.* And so, anathema sit" (p. 45).

(The words I have italicized are taken by Dr Mascall from Article XXII, where, however, they are directed *against* Invocation of Saints, etc. How are truths divinely revealed, if not by Scripture and inference? Is there any warranty in Scripture for going beyond the warranty of Scripture? On whom does the *onus probandi* lie?)

This forthright Mariology is given Scriptural support by Fr Thornton. He begins:

> "*We shall assume the truth of the catholic and orthodox tradition concerning the Virgin-Mother* and her part in the economy of redemption; and we will inquire in what degree and in what manner the Scriptures can be found to throw light upon the doctrine" (p. 9).

(My italics. Scripture is here used not to test the tradition but to illustrate it.) Extremely involved allegorical interpretation in the Rabbinic style follows, frequently marked by phrases like "This might suggest," "this may well have been in the Apostle's mind." The main theme is that Mary fulfils the types of Eve, and Israel the Virgin-Mother, and so is the mother of all Christians. To give one example, on p. 22, John xvi, 20-22 is proved to allude to Isa. lxvi, 7-14, Israel's rebirth, *because* John xv, 21 echoes Isa. lxvi, 5 (the gap of 26 verses in John being conveniently ignored). A hidden meaning is thus substituted for the contextual meaning of "a woman when she is in travail."

Mr Parker's support on the devotional side is largely an *ad hominem* application of the principle that not to offer the traditional "Western Catholic" devotion to Mary is either to betray an inadequate or heretical theology of Christ, or else to exhibit "devotional schizophrenia" (p. 74). He is "shocked" at the question, "Why do you want to see your mother so often?" (p. 66: to want to see your mother too often can be symptomatic). He sees a danger in the Western emphasis on asking Mary for things, and would correct it by learning from the Orthodox to praise her more. In such a return to the East "we can learn peacefully to cultivate our spiritual garden in which Mary must be the Burning Bush which brings to us the presence of God" (p. 75).

Readers must judge for themselves how far these three papers are true to the Anglican approach. For our part, we can only say, with all reverence for the learning and devotion of their writers, that they will only mislead the Orthodox if they are taken as characteristics of Anglican thinking. These papers represent the Counter-Reformation wing of the Anglo-Catholic movement rather than the main stream of Anglican divinity, and a disservice to the cause of reunion will be done unless that fact is widely recognized.

BASIL S. MOSS.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE FAST BEFORE COMMUNION

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

In his article on "The Fast Before Communion" in your February number, the Rev. G. R. Dunstan refers to the realistic way in which the Church of Rome "has responded to the demands of the faithful in war-time, and of the apostolate to a newly pagan Europe after it, with realistic dispensations grounded, not in expediency alone, but in a new historical and theological approach to the whole relation of liturgy and discipline to society." He then goes on to refer to recent developments in France and Europe in general, concerning the relaxations of the Eucharistic fast and the time of the celebration of Mass.

May I draw the attention of your readers to a remarkable book, published recently in the United States, *The Mass of the Future*, by Gerald Ellard, S.J. (Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1948, $4.00)? Chapter 35, in particular, shows how the movement for evening masses, with the consequent relaxation of the fast before Communion, has been growing on the American continent, supported by authority, for many years past. The chapter has an important bibliography of papal documents relating to evening masses in Mexico, Russia, and the U.S.A., showing that the movement is by no means confined to France.

Yours faithfully,

H. P. SAUNDERS.

ST ANDREW'S VICARAGE,
WEST BROMWICH.

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

While glad to notice that Mr Dunstan in his two articles on this topic (THEOLOGY, January and February, 1950) has given up Dearmer's view that the rule of fasting before communion was first laid down by Thomas Aquinas, I find that he has so far mishandled the patristic evidence as to leave the question of the origin of the practice more obscure than it was before. I must beg your leave to present once more some of the more important evidences in what may, I hope, be regarded as a clearer light.

The response of Timothy of Alexandria (died 385), which settles

the scruples of some questioner about drops of water swallowed before communion, was regarded by Dearmer as spurious. This, as Mr Dunstan allows, was a mistake on Dearmer's part. When Mr Dunstan goes on to suggest that the fast may have been a work of penance, and not the routine before communion, he goes against the plain wording of the text, where the question begins thus: "If anyone is fasting for the purpose of communicating . . ." The purpose is clearly given in these words, and it would be wrong to supply from hypothesis any other. Mr Dunstan's further argument that this response gives only the point of view of one man at Alexandria in the fourth century quite disregards the use made of this and other similar responses in later councils and in canonical collections such as that of Balsamon.

A passage in a homily of John Chrysostom (*hom. xxvii in* 1 *Cor.*: Migne, *P.G.* 61. 231) suggests to Mr Dunstan that: "He teaches penitential fasting in the days of preparation for communion; there is nothing to show that a rule of fasting reception was ever in his mind." He has not noticed that in one of his letters (*ep.* 125; *P.G.* 52. 683) John Chrysostom protests against the charge his enemies have brought up to malign him. They say that he has given the Eucharist to men who were not fasting; John denies this and wishes that he may be damned eternally if ever he did such a thing. When therefore in the homily cited above John says to his hearers: "You fasted beforehand, in order to appear somehow worthy of communion," and when he goes on to urge temperance after, as well as before, communion, it is clear that he is talking about the eucharistic fast. His suggestion of temperance after communion obviously arouses in the minds of his hearers the question: "Must we fast after communion as well as before?" John puts this question to himself, and answers: "I don't mean that, but don't indulge yourselves to repletion." Clearly, he distinguishes between temperance or penitential restraint upon eating and the eucharistic fast.

The letter of Augustine to Januarius (*ep.* 54; *C.S.E.L.* II. 166) is important because here it is common ground between the two men that on every other day in the year except Maundy Thursday fasting communion is the rule. It is this fact that seems to justify Januarius's question about Maundy Thursday. If fasting communion is the rule, ought one to eat before the evening Eucharist on Maundy Thursday? If, however, it is right to hold *that one Eucharist* after a meal, does this mean that the whole Church is wrong to practise fasting communion as a rule? The matter is further complicated by the Lenten fast and by the fact that Augustine has only one word, *ieiunare*, for the two fasts. The truncated state of the liturgy for Maundy Thursday (*cf.* the *Ordo Iohannis archicantoris*, ed. Silva-Tarouca, Rome, 1923, p. 209) is perhaps due to the celebration of a common meal beforehand, in place of the lections and psalms. Augustine's conciliar document (Hippo, 393, and Carthage, 397) is misconstrued by Mr Dunstan. Its opening words, *Ut sacramenta altaris nonnisi a ieiunis hominibus celebrentur*, are taken by him to refer to priests celebrating the Eucharist. In reality the words mean

that all (men and women) should *attend* Mass fasting. (This use of *celebrare*, meaning "to do, or take part in," is common from the time of Tacitus, and was fully discussed in relation to this canon by Fr Thurston in the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, December, 1934.) In Augustine's day the faithful were thought to take part in Mass, and the division of roles between a "celebrant" and "spectators" had not been made. The canon makes an exception for Maundy Thursday, and then makes regulations forbidding Requiem Masses, should these be desired to take place late in the day for someone who has died that same day.

> *Si aliquorum pomeridiano tempore defunctorum, sive episcoporum sive ceterorum, commemoratio facienda est, solis orationibus fiat, si illi qui faciunt iam pransi inveniuntur.*

The *Ordo* of John the arch-cantor has a regulation on Sunday Requiems which throws light on this practice (Silva-Tarouca, *op. cit.*, p. 205):

> *Si necesse fuerit ut in ipso die sepeliantur, ieiunat sacerdos cum parentibus ipsius defuncti usque ad horam nonam, et ponent eum in ecclesia et celebrantur agendas ipsius, offerentes pro ipso oblationem et sic sepeliunt eum.*

This rule would secure that one who died on a Sunday morning, when the priest and people were still fasting before the Eucharist, could have a Requiem: if they were not fasting, prayers would have to suffice for that day.

Mr Dunstan has badly misconstrued the Declaration of Theophilus of Alexandria about the Epiphany fast. The bishop tells his congregation that because to-day the vigil of the Epiphany has fallen on the Sunday, they need not wait until after the ninth hour to break their fast (as would be normal on a fast day), but should go home from the Sunday morning Eucharist and partake of a handful of dates before reassembling for the all-night vigil which began at the ninth hour. (For the keeping of this vigil in Egypt in the fourth century, *cf.* the *Pilgrimage of Etheria*, ed. McClure and Feltoe, pp. 16-17.) There is no suggestion that they are to "delay communion until three o'clock," as Mr Dunstan supposes.

The *practice* of not eating before communicating is vouched for by Tertullian and Hippolytus. For them the *motive* is to preserve oneself from harm by this *prægustatio*. By the fourth century the motive has changed to one of reverence for the sacrament, but the practice goes on. Even so, the old motive is not excluded, for the Church of to-day gives the Eucharist *ad tutamentum mentis et corporis*. The change of emphasis is not due, as Mr Dunstan implies, to a misinterpretation of the evidence by Fr Thurston, but is there in the documents themselves. The *Testamentum Domini* (II. 20 and 25), in its amalgam of ancient and modern, has both ideas side by side. More could be said on other points of evidence, but I hope that the foregoing shows how unfounded are Mr Dunstan's contentions.

Yours faithfully,

Heythrop College. J. H. Crehan, S.J.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRISTIANITY AND HISTORY. By Herbert Butterfield. George Bell and Sons. 7s. 6d.

Professor Butterfield's lectures on Christianity and history, here reproduced in book form, have had so much success, in the sense of getting their subject widely discussed, that it is perhaps worth while to look for the causes of the popular interest that he has aroused and of the passion which has gone with so much of the discussion. In the first place, it is a well-written example of that ever-popular sort of book in which the author undertakes to examine the frontiers between his own subject and others and to relate his study to matters of wider interest. Secondly, since his subject is the study of history and what it holds for man, he cannot fail to touch almost every twentieth-century man with a claim to opinions of his own. For, of nearly every shade of opinion current to-day, it may be said that it boils down to a doctrine of man which is based consciously or unconsciously upon a particular reading of history.

Since the outrunning of moral and political progress by that of science and the techniques, it has often been assumed that the study of history ought to be able to equip man with the data or formulas necessary for his satisfactory social and moral guidance, in much the same way as the study of the physical sciences has equipped him to combat disease and to increase the conveniences of life. So distinguished a thinker as the late Professor Collingwood once expressed this need, so commonly felt, as a need for "a contemporary science of human affairs . . . from which man could learn to deal with human situations as skilfully as natural science had taught him to deal with situations in the world of nature." And, indeed, for him the need seems to be met, for, as he wrote, "The answer was now clear and certain. The science of human affairs was history." Very few historians could be found to agree with this view. They are much too well aware of the limitations of their study to expect it to provide the foundations for an intellectual structure of this kind. Perhaps the greatest service that Professor Butterfield has done in this work is to make clear some of these limitations. He is at his best when emphasizing the utter difference between the study of history and that of physical science.

History is perhaps best regarded as a sphere of study suitable for the extension of human experience beyond the borders set by a single individual lifetime and, as such, more likely to produce its fruits in the shape of wisdom and understanding than of exact knowledge. There is of necessity a good deal of the historian himself in every piece of historical writing—"the historian," writes Professor Butterfield, "shares the defects of human nature himself and speaks out of the arena." He does good service when he stresses the fact that history will not of itself bear the assertion that man is moving towards some sort of perfection to be achieved in time—that it is not, as he pungently expresses it, a train busily engaged in get-

ting somewhere—and when, in consequence of this, he lays emphasis upon the eternal importance of the moral issues of the moment, and thereby restores to each individual generation something of its full stature, releasing its members from the category of mere rungs in a ladder leading to, but far from, some future perfection in time. He sees clearly the extent to which the doctrine of perfectibility leads to the perpetual creation of "human devils" in the shape of individuals, peoples or institutions, and the consequence of this in what he calls "the messianic hoax of the twentieth century which comes perilously near to the thesis of 'just one little war more against the last remaining enemies of righteousness, and then the world will be cleansed, and we can start building Paradise.' "

If this were all, Professor Butterfield's book would be unexceptionable, and few professional historians other than those doctrinaires who are more properly styled publicists would find fault with what he has to say. Unhappily for his chief and very valuable thesis, he has interspersed and sometimes clothed it with some historical statement and comment which is controversial and at times, it must be admitted, surprising. He apparently rejects the claims of contemporary history to be a suitable field for scholarly study. Yet he freely enters this field himself, with rather ready generalizations and sometimes with astonishing statements, as when he asserts that the explanation which has "stressed the rigidity of mind displayed by the French General Staff" makes other analyses of the defeat of France in 1940 "look cheap."

Further, as part of his condemnation of the study of contemporary history, and of the emphasis he most usefully places upon the fact that historical events and periods seem different to different generations of their students, he makes the surprising statement that "the whole apparently exact historical framework which we have built up over the last fifty years will be replaced and revised so radically that the quarrels between pro-Munich and anti-Munich will seem like the quarrels of Tweedledum and Tweedledee." Perhaps a little more attention to the data of contemporary history would have led Professor Butterfield to realize that the fact which has kept this quarrel alive and made it so bitter is precisely that the issues at stake were seen by many people as moral issues.

To make even by implication the assertion that there were in 1938 other processes at work of such importance that the issues of Munich could be reasonably ignored appears to be the equivalent of creating a doctrine about history even more monstrous than those whose hollowness Professor Butterfield has so admirably exposed. It is unhappily true that this book, which has so much that is valuable to say about historical studies, will seem to many to contain some very doubtful history.

H. S. Deighton.

Pembroke College,
Oxford.

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES. By Burton Scott Easton. S.C.M. Press. 10s. 6d.

THE JOHANNINE EPISTLES. By C. J. Barker. Lutterworth Press. 5s.

A GUIDE TO THE GOSPELS. By W. Graham Scroggie. Pickering and Inglis. 25s.

How many purposes can a book of theology serve? Authors are often sanguine in their expectations, expressing the hope that their work will be useful to the general reader, of some value to scholars, welcomed by parish priests, and devoured by schoolmasters and students in training colleges. Experience shows that it is but rarely that a book meets even one of these needs superlatively well, whilst several attempts that might otherwise have been successful miss the mark through failure to decide at which target to aim. Confined though the public for theology is, it is no more uniform than any other. Distinct needs cannot all be met in one operation. In reviewing these books, their expressed purpose will be observed and the question then asked how successfully they achieve it.

Professor Easton writes for the "non-technical" reader, though the hope is expressed that the book may be useful even to specialists. It must be said at once that specialists will find much to admire. On the other hand, the "non-technical" reader, who presumably has never read for the Honour School of Theology, taken the G.O.E., or made any systematic study of Scripture, is likely to find less nourishment. He surely needs to be given in a commentary on the Pastorals the materials that will enable him to form a general picture of their purpose and meaning and make up his own mind about such points that are in dispute among scholars as come within his compass. True, Dr Easton refers him to Harrison, as well as to Dibelius, Falconer, Jeremias, and Lock: but he is a lucky "non-technical" reader if he has both the time and the mind to persevere with such researches. The danger is that he will give up the attempt altogether. If he can make headway with this book, it is likely to prove seriously misleading to him, not only because of the omission of much that he ought to know (*i.e.*, Harrison's fascinating if sometimes far-fetched placing of what are taken to be the genuine Pauline fragments), but also because some highly doubtful assertions are made with an authority that in view of Dr Easton's credentials is likely to carry unmerited conviction. For example, one of the arguments for rejecting the authenticity of 2 Tim. iii, 15 as a genuine Pauline instruction to Timothy is that "Eunice could not have brought up her son with an intimate knowledge of the Book that denounced her apostasy and his uncircumcized life." Neither human nature nor the Old Testament is as simple as all that.

The specialist will certainly fare better. In particular, the word studies that take up some sixty pages are excellently done, even if those on the Ministry require close scrutiny. It is a great gain to have the Pastorals considered in the light of Hippolytus and *Didascalia*. Good use has been made of the materials in Strack-Billerbeck and Kittel, and the translation of the text of the Pastorals deserves

to be very widely known. Nevertheless, the central argument developed here is far from convincing. The Pastorals are the work of an enthusiastic but ill-informed admirer of St Paul who uses the fiction of Pauline letters to Timothy and Titus to warn the young bishops, who in his age were just emerging from the earlier presbyterate, to guard the sound tradition of the past. Dr Easton argues that St Paul had not arranged for a settled ministry in the churches of his foundation (dismissing Acts xiv, 23 as an anachronism); but that the Palestinian Christian organization of the presbyterate gradually spread through the Church to be followed later when it proved inadequate by what was to become the monarchical episcopate copied from the single headship of James in Jerusalem. This is certainly neat and tidy: but the simplicity is gained by discounting, among other comparatively less important things, the part which the Apostles must themselves of necessity have played in the shaping of the Ministry. Surely the use to which the author of the Pastorals put the prestige of Timothy and Titus was possible only because it was known that they had actually possessed, and that by St Paul's will, the authority which is here represented as theirs.

The Rev. C. J. Barker writes in the Lutterworth series of commentaries, the purpose of which as described on the dustcover is "to meet the needs of the ordinary Bible-reader, who has no specialized knowledge and who is anxious above all to discover a message and a meaning for life in the world of to-day." Such a man will find a great deal to help him in this book, for though only the minimum of technical language is used and that minimum is carefully explained in plain terms, the thought of the Epistles is not simplified away. The Introduction, especially where it shows the relevance of Docetic and Gnostic heresies to the Epistles' theme, is excellent, though more might have been said about their very close bearing on "life in the world of to-day."

Apart from the particular criticisms to be made below, there is only one doubt as regards the success of Mr Barker's work, and that concerns the fitness of what has become the traditional form of commentary for the task now laid upon it. Inevitably, the Epistles so treated lose that luminous vitality which has to so many hearers and readers in so many ages made real as few other writings have done the interpenetration of this life by the eternal which is their theme. What seems to be demanded is a technique that would leave more to the reader than would be proper in a commentary and so lead him not only to begin at any rate to understand, but also to pray.

A few criticisms have to be made. Not all readers will agree with Mr Barker in finding "a note of undue harshness and hardness" in 1 John iv. 6 and, though more muted, in 2 John 10 f. It is a pity, too, that he assumes that "the demand for an episcopacy with wide powers" was due to the growth of heresy. Streeter's highly questionable account of Diotrephes is repeated and underlined. Is the fact that he loved to have the pre-eminence really such proof positive that he was a bishop? Happy were the Church whose vices were so confined.

Dr Scroggie's purpose is to supply a guide to the student who wishes to know the Gospels thoroughly and intimately. It may be said with every confidence that no man could use this book as it is intended to be used, with its careful and elaborate plan of study and insistence upon thorough and repeated reading of the Gospels themselves, without becoming a master of his subject. There is, I can well believe, everything here that he needs to know: and for his further studies he is referred to some 700 books in the skeleton bibliography. How many will work conscientiously through the Guide alone is another matter: but if the non-technical reader (if I may use the phrase) cares enough for the Gospels to want to know them better it is well that he should be reminded that he must be prepared to read hard, think hard, and pray hard. Of the three books reviewed here, Dr Scroggie's seems on reflection to be the most likely to achieve its end.

G. O. Williams.

Llandovery College.

Diary of a Dean. By W. R. Inge. Hutchinson. 21s.

Thirty years ago Dick Sheppard told me I should beg, borrow, or steal anything written by Dean Inge, and how right he was. I would offer the same advice to young men of the present day, and perhaps especially to young clergymen, not in the hope that they may agree with the great man, much less try to teach and preach the same perplexing good (?) news to another generation, but in the belief that all contact with a keen, fearless, and truth-loving mind like his must act as a stimulus and a tonic, purging away such woolly and sentimental rubbish as may linger in their own. They will be interested not in the Diary as such but in the further revelation it inevitably gives of the writer's mind and character, mellowed but not softened nor essentially changed by more than ninety years' experience of life.

The Dean still takes an impish delight in shocking us and in pricking popular bubbles. He quotes with evident relish, though without the conceit such words might have inspired in lesser men, part of a speech made by Archbishop Lord Lang at a farewell dinner in 1934: "There must be a demon in the Dean, a kind of gadfly which darts hither and thither in Pucklike fashion. It does not bite, but it has a sting in its tail. It is this which gives him the right to be known as a wit; but with the humour there is always a serious desire to seek for truth. The Dean's greatest contribution, perhaps, to the life and work of the Church is his untiring fight against the wrong-headed exponents of unsound theories and one-sided bigots. His clear and direct mind easily shows up the fallacies, and his caustic wit destroys them. Of all such self-inflated balloons and egotistical bladders he is the prince of prickers." It would be hard to improve on that thumbnail sketch.

The Dean is sure of himself and of his opinion: he is not troubled by seeing both sides of a picture: for him the other side might not

exist. The General Strike of 1926 was just what Cardinal Bourne called it—"a sin against God." There is nothing to be said for democracy or for the Labour Party. One envies his certainty and the ease with which he seems to reach his conclusions. He deals hard blows and is in no way shaken when he receives correspondingly hard blows in return. He is careless of public opinion. You may take what the oracle gives you or leave it as you please. This assumption of infallibility seems to range him alongside of Roman Catholic and Anglo-Catholic controversialists—strange bed-fellows for the Dean—but however exasperating for those inclined to challenge such a position it extorts an unwilling admiration, and it must be added that the Dean's security is based not on authority but almost invariably on shrewd private judgment. *The Times* wrote of him in 1934, "in divine and in secular wisdom alike he has been one of the principal public oracles for the last twenty years and more."

Those who are familiar with *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion* or with *Vale* will not be surprised when they have an occasional glimpse in this Diary of a most touching Christian simplicity and warmth of heart to which his closest friends will testify. You must read a letter like that on p. 138 or Appendix B, in which he writes of his recent bereavement, before you can gain a true and comprehensive mental picture of the Dean.

Is it insular pride to claim him as a typical Englishman? One may seldom have the good fortune to meet a man of his independence, sagacity, and strength, but if one does the chances are that he was born and bred in this island.

ERIC HAMILTON, BISHOP.

THE DEANERY,
WINDSOR CASTLE.

THE DOCTOR'S PROFESSION. Edited by Daniel T. Jenkins. S.C.M. Press. 4s. 6d.

A group of doctors holding Christian convictions met together to consider what relation their religion should bear to their profession and to discuss practical problems which face the Christian doctor every day. This book, though edited by a theologian who was present at the discussions, sums up the opinions at which they arrived.

There is no doubt about the need for such a book. The education of a doctor takes account chiefly of material things and the scientific tendency of medicine tends to make the student ignore the spiritual side of man. The same idea has recently been expressed by the Principal of Aberdeen University in the following words: "It will be increasingly recognized that man has a spiritual structure which must be respected no less than the physical structure with which it has some kind of relation—there now devolves upon the doctor in general practice a quasi-pastoral function which derives from the pathetic and even terrifying trust which simple folk repose in him." It is only recently that those who control medical education have taken any notice even of the social aspect of the patient's diseases,

and it has happened that the newly qualified doctor has first realized his deficiencies when faced by some ethical or social problem propounded by his patient. In the chapter in this book dealing with medical education the recommendation is made that students should be given some guidance on the moral and spiritual problems they are likely to meet; at the same time a greater mingling of students from all the faculties is advised so that each faculty (including the medical) may broaden the basis of their experience.

In the chapter on "the doctor as technician" it is pointed out that technical efficiency is the first but not the only necessity in the doctor's equipment. Attention is called to the "purity and holiness" enjoined in the Hippocratic oath, and the remark is made that "in trying to contract out of the moral responsibilities which medical practice necessarily entails the doctor-technician is flying in the face of plain facts."

One of the most remarkable features of this book is the fact that it is the joint production of Roman Catholics and Protestants; that such divergent views could be discussed and summarized is of welcome augury for the future, for in face of the challenge of materialism it will be necessary for all the forces of Christendom to get closer together. The common ground for all Christians is here said to be the belief that the universe is the sphere of operation of a God who made it, guides it, and sustains it, and that God made known to men His own nature and purpose in the person and work of Jesus Christ. An intense reverence for human life is a consequence of this belief and is the ultimate justification for the work of the medical profession. From this reverence for human life follow distinctive Christian views on euthanasia, abortion, and the like.

The chapter on ethical problems deals with the use of contraceptives, abortion, artificial insemination, the control of venereal disease, euthanasia, and prefrontal leucotomy. Here there is much room for difference of opinion, but the reader will find a very fair hearing given to both sides of the questions. There are interesting chapters on the Christian doctor's attitude to psychiatry and to medical missions and a final chapter on the practical tasks of to-day. In the latter the suggestion is made that there should be some association of Christian doctors who might thus be better able to make their opinion known and increase the weight of that opinion.

This book is edited by a theologian, and this may account for the fact that in several places it is stated categorically that Christians believe that suffering is due to sin. We should doubt if the majority of Christian doctors think so.

V. Zachary Cope.

Hampstead.

Unto a Full-grown Man. Vol. VII—Anglican Mission. Edited by S. H. Evans and E. W. Southcott. S.P.C.K. 6s.

This series, prepared particularly for the A.Y.P.A., has proved one of the most valuable aids yet provided for post-Confirmation and adult religious education. It is based on "the well-tried methods

of St Ignatius" (p. 1), and under the headings Prepare, Picture, Ponder, Pray, and Promise it works out a method of corporate mental action in line with modern educational trends.

The publication of the seventh volume is to be warmly welcomed, for it makes clear that concern for the Church overseas is not just a hobby of certain missionary enthusiasts, but an integral part of any church membership that is worth the name.

For the volume the editors have called in a team of contributors all of whom write with first-hand authority on their subjects. Professor Hodges starts off with a thought-provoking chapter on "The Genius of Anglicanism," and this is followed by studies of the two great societies—S.P.G. and C.M.S.

The volume then proceeds to take one on a conducted tour of the Anglican Communion—the Middle East, Africa, the New World, India, China and Japan, and the southern dominions of Australia and New Zealand. The purpose of each chapter, as the one on Canada puts it, "is to tell in a clear and simple manner the life-story of one branch of the Church of England" (p. 106). This aim the different sections succeed in fulfilling admirably, keeping a nice balance in the process between general history and particular illustration. All who work through this material will have a clear understanding of the story of the growth of the Anglican Communion.

At the end Professor Hodges makes a further stimulating contribution on the religions of the world, which should prove of particular value to fifth and sixth formers infected with the relativism of much school teaching on "comparative religion."

The main weakness of the book springs from the long delay which has evidently supervened between the writing of the sections and the publication of the whole. (One contributor known to the reviewer died in October, 1947.) Thus the section on East Africa is "pre-groundnuts." The chapter on the Church in China never mentions Communism. And the chapter on India knows nothing of the coming into being of the Dominions of India and Pakistan.

The background of all Christian work in Asia to-day is the rapid expansion of Communism and the revival of Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist national cultures, which have followed the ending of colonial status. The Anglican Communion, like other branches of Christ's Church, may well have to face not opportunity but restriction, not advance but persecution and a following of the *Via dolorosa*. The story of the Church in Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary may be repeated in the story of the Church in China and Burma.

That means that our approach to the missionary task of the Church in the next half-century may well have to undergo a profound revolution. The cry may have to be, not "Christ or Chaos," but "Christ despite Chaos." *Anglican Mission* might well have helped Christians in England to face this possible return of a pre-Constantine era in many parts of Asia, but the book has been overtaken by events and its references to current affairs are already dated.

Any group using this book, then, will have to supplement and

correct the picture it gives of the situation in many parts of the world. Indeed, it may well be not the least stimulating part of such a group's work to try and see the significance of the changed situation in Asia for the Church of Christ in general and for that part of it to which we belong in particular.

C. Kenneth Sansbury.

Lincoln Theological College
(Scholæ Cancellarii).

Tribal Heritage. A study of the Santals. By W. J. Culshaw. Lutterworth Press. 21s.

The Santals, who numbered two and a half million souls in 1931, are the second largest aboriginal tribe in India. Everywhere they live intermingled with more advanced communities, and in the Bankura District of Western Bengal, where Mr Culshaw collected his material, they form only some 12 per cent. of the population. Nevertheless they have always maintained their cohesion, and the worst social crime a Santal can commit is to marry outside his tribe.

Having in the first twelve chapters of his book given a concise account of Santali social and religious institutions, the author proceeds to consider, against this background, the impact of Christian missions on the ancient ways of life and the new community formed by converts. As he makes clear, his references to missions are to those in the sabbatarian rather than sacramental tradition.

Mr Culshaw's statements and conclusions are marked throughout by perfect frankness and sound scholarship based on wide sociological reading. For instance, he acknowledges freely the firm belief of the unconverted Santals in their ancestral faith and the reverence of the priests who serve them. Equally frank, and particularly interesting, is his estimate of the three main reasons why Santals are reluctant to accept Christianity. First, they dislike the puritanism which has coloured so much of the teaching, especially in the early days of missionary work. Secondly, they dislike the largely unintended "marginal teaching," with its social and material implications. "I shall never become a Christian. What should I do with a pair of shoes?" an old man is quoted as saying. Thirdly, and most important of all, the ordinary Santal sees in Christianity something that threatens to become a disintegrating influence which will destroy the cohesion of his clan and tribe, a cohesion which alone has preserved a poor, primitive, and heavily outnumbered community throughout the centuries.

These objections are mirrored by stresses within the Christian community, of which the most serious arise from education, since it tends to result in detribalization and exaggerated individualism, and to produce men who, whatever their merits, are no longer Santals in anything but name. These and other difficulties are by no means peculiar to Santal missions, and this outstanding contribution to missionary literature will repay study by workers in world-wide fields.

A fuller index would have been welcome, and the extensive bibliography would have been improved by brief criticisms of the items, all of which are not of equal reliability and value.

LONDON. J. P. MILLS.

THE PROVERBS OF SOLOMON. Edited by A. D. Power. Longmans. 6s.

The sub-title on the dust-cover calls this book "a new conflation," and Mr Power uses the same term in his short introduction, adding by way of parenthesis "for that is all it really is." Despite these modest protestations, however, there is no doubt that here is a welcome addition to the library of books designed to promote the true understanding of the Holy Scriptures.

Following the same general plan as he adopted for his earlier book on Ecclesiasticus, Mr Power has increased the value of his work in this case by adding over seventy pages of notes and sixty pages of glossary. The main task the editor set himself in his conflation was "to adhere as closely as possible to the language of the Authorized Version, to express the sense of the original as nearly as possible in English words, and to make obscure passages clear." In pursuing this aim Mr Power admits that he has taken certain liberties with the text, the most dubious of which would seem to be the complete omission of certain passages, "where the text is so corrupt that no sense can be made out of the original, and where no one has suggested even a plausible emendation." Passages so treated, however, are few.

The canonical book of the Proverbs, as the reader is reminded in the introduction, is "not intended for continuous reading so much as for reference or for browsing." This edition makes reference simple, for there are clear marginal enumerations of chapter and verse, and in addition there are useful sub-headings and a full index. Making no claims to scholarship, the compiler, who besides being the director of a large business house has long been a member of the Society for Old Testament Study, has closely consulted all reputable modern works on the subject, as his list of authorities shows. And the general reader, as well as the scholar, will be grateful to Mr Power for this book, upon which he has bestowed so much loving labour.

ST DAVID'S. C. WITTON-DAVIES.

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